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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of the
developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions.  The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Macroeconomic and
Development Policies Branch, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising the awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research carried out under the project is coordinated by Professor Dani Rodrik,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The research papers are
discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings of  the G-24 Technical Group,
and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers and Deputies in their preparations
for negotiations and discussions in the framework of the IMF’s International Monetary
and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) and the Joint IMF/IBRD
Development Committee, as well as in other forums. Previously, the research papers for
the G-24 were published by UNCTAD in the collection International Monetary and
Financial Issues for the 1990s.  Between 1992 and 1999 more than 80 papers were
published in 11 volumes of this collection, covering a wide range of monetary and financial
issues of major interest to developing countries. Since the beginning of 2000 the studies
are published jointly by UNCTAD and the Center for International Development at
Harvard University in the G-24 Discussion Paper Series.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and the Governments of
Denmark and the Netherlands, as well as contributions from the countries participating
in the meetings of the  G-24.INTERESTS AND OPTIONS OF DEVELOPING AND
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Abstract
Negotiating interests and options have to be identified against the background of the possible
agenda of a new round. Several important elements of this agenda are codified in what is referred
to as the “built-in agenda”, including: (i) an assessment of the implementation of Uruguay
Round Agreements (URAs); (ii) specific reviews of particular agreements that were mandated
by the Uruguay Round; and, as the core of a new round, (iii) new negotiations on agriculture,
GATS, and TRIPs. Possible further components of the agenda could be negotiations on trade
and investment, competition policy, trade facilitation, transparency in government procurement,
environmental and labour standards, and further liberalization of industrial tariffs, and textiles
and clothing.
Many developing and least-developed countries are reluctant to support such a
comprehensive agenda, because they are still pre-occupied with difficult administrative,
institutional and financial problems arising from the implementation of various URAs. They
also have difficulties in articulating the strategies that could underpin the identification of their
negotiating interests and options. Their preparation for a new round is likely to be mostly
inadequate owing to a lack of human knowledge and institutional capacity that an effective
participation in the WTO process requires. They will thus have to take decisions on complex
issues that they may not have adequately analysed and understood. But a new trade round will
also present an important opportunity for developing countries to press for enhanced market
access and to undo some of the damages imposed by the URAs dealing with rules and standards.
They have taken on many mandatory obligations in exchange for non-binding and “best
endeavour” concessions from the developed countries. Rebalancing this situation should be a
major concern for both the developing and the least-developed countries. The new round should
also offer the low-income countries an opportunity to be more pro-active in terms of defining its
agenda, for instance in proposing multilaterally negotiated decisions regarding the criteria for
categorizing WTO member countries, as well as the form and context of “special and differential
treatment” for the developing and least-developed countries.
This paper discusses the trade-strategy options of low-income countries, the areas of
greatest interest to developing countries, as well as those that are to pose the greatest difficulties,
the question of how developing countries can enhance the effectiveness of their participation in
the new Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and also makes some suggestions on how to
change WTO governance and management structures in order to ensure that the concerns of
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I. Introduction
An important component of the preparation
process leading to the launch of a new round of mul-
tilateral trade negotiations is the identification and
analysis of negotiating interests and options by the
various categories of the membership of the WTO.
This should be attempted against the background of
an understanding of what the agenda of the negotia-
tions will look like. Important elements of the agenda
have been pre-determined and are codified in what
is referred to as the “built-in agenda”. This includes
three key components. First is an assessment of the
implementation of existing Uruguay Round Agree-
ments (URAs). This embraces a review of the
implementation experience and its primary purpose
would be to identify areas where difficulties have
been encountered and, hence, where appropriate
changes may need to be made so as to facilitate en-
hanced adherence to rules and commitments as well
as the realization of the benefits which the URAs
were intended to yield to the participating countries.
The envisaged review and assessment is, in princi-
ple, quite comprehensive as it should cover all articles
of GATT 1994, the Marrakesh Protocol to the Gen-
eral Agreement, the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), each of the other individual agree-
ments (such as agriculture, textiles and clothing,
intellectual property protection, etc.), as well as the
Understanding on Dispute Settlement, Trade Policy
Review Mechanism, and the Ministerial Decisions and
Declarations, including those issued at Marrakesh.
Second are the specific reviews of particular
agreements that were mandated by the UR and stipu-
lated in each of the affected agreements. Under this
heading, specific reviews are due by early 2000 with
respect to various elements of the agreements on
agriculture, anti-dumping, customs valuation, dispute
settlement, rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary
(SPS) measures, trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights (TRIPs), trade-related investment
measures (TRIMs), and GATS, among others.
The third key component of the negotiating
agenda is, perhaps, even more pre-determined than
the earlier two. While these call for assessment and
reviews which may lead to changes that will then
have to be negotiated, the third agenda item more
specifically mandates new negotiations on agricul-
ture, GATS, and TRIPs. The negotiations on these
items can be regarded as the core of a new trade
round.
There is a possible fourth component. At the
Singapore Ministerial Conference, a work pro-
gramme was adopted which included the establish-
ment of working groups around a number of issues.
Based on the reports of the working groups, further
steps with respect to these issues are to be decided,
in particular whether or not each of the issues should
be included in the negotiating agenda of the Millen-
nium Round, although the work of the working
groups was not meant to pre-commit members to a
decision to negotiate on any of these issues. At least
four of these issues will be discussed at the Third
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Ministerial Conference (TMC). These are trade and
investment, trade and competition policy, trade fa-
cilitation, and transparency in government procure-
ment. In addition, there at least two other issues that
continue to be debated in and around the WTO; i.e.
environmental and labour standards. Although they
are not part of the WTO work programme that is
meant to feed into the TMC and possible future ne-
gotiations, it would not be surprising if they are
pushed into the negotiating agenda.
Furthermore, there could well be a fifth com-
ponent to the negotiating agenda. Discussions within
and outside the WTO suggest that multilateral nego-
tiations based on all or a subset of the first four
components identified above would not reflect a suf-
ficient “balance of interests” among WTO members.
In other words, many countries are apparently luke-
warm to the idea of a new round of multilateral trade
negotiations which focuses primarily on a limited
number of sectoral areas (i.e. agriculture, services,
and intellectual properly rights). To eliminate this
reluctance, it has been suggested that the agenda of
negotiations should be broadened to include further
liberalization of industrial tariffs and in textiles and
clothing.
Many developing and least-developed countries
are, apparently, reluctant to support a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations with such a compre-
hensive agenda. The basis of their reluctance is well
founded. Many of them are still pre-occupied with
dealing with the problems arising from and getting
their economies to adjust the changes imposed by the
implementation of various UR agreements. They are
confronted with difficult administrative, institutional
and financial problems in meeting the obligations
that constitute integral parts of these agreements.
Many of them face similar problems in the process
of internalizing the implications of the UR agree-
ments and trying to realize the benefits that the
agreements promised. Their fundamental disabilities
in these two broad areas (i.e. fulfilling obligations
and actualizing benefits) are clearly related to the
difficulties being experienced in identifying specific
negotiating interests and options in the context of a
future round of negotiations, whether narrowly de-
fined (as in the built-in agenda) or more broadly
conceived to include additional “balancing” items.
Perhaps more significantly, many developing and
least-developed countries are experiencing some dif-
ficulty in articulating the trade and development
strategies that should underpin and guide the identi-
fication of their negotiating interests and options in
the context of a new round.
These difficulties notwithstanding, the devel-
oping and least-developed countries cannot afford
to de-link themselves from the globalizing trends in
the world economy. Their continued, more active and
effective participation in the WTO process should
therefore be regarded as an unavoidable imperative.
These countries need to preserve and enhance mar-
ket access for their exports of goods and services.
Hence, their negotiating interests are more likely to
be more fully covered in a broadly defined agenda
of multilateral trade negotiations than in a narrow
one. But their negotiating interests go well beyond
the issue of enhanced market access with respect to
such broad sectors as agriculture, industry and serv-
ices. Many developing and least-developed countries
have significant concerns about the general rules that
govern the WTO process which, in turn, conditions
the extent of their meaningful participation in the
process, including the actualization of the potential
market access benefits that they are entitled to. Their
interests and options should therefore be identified
and analysed not only with respect to market access
conditions but also in relation to the WTO rules. Fi-
nally, since these negotiating interests are more likely
to be growth-enhancing if they are chosen and pur-
sued in the context of an appropriate trade and
development strategy, relating these interests to the
underlying strategy becomes an important analyti-
cal and policy challenge.
Therefore, this paper offers a broadly analyti-
cal but policy-relevant perspective on the interests
and options of the developing and least-developed
countries in a future round of multilateral trade ne-
gotiations. The paper’s primary thrust is built around
four questions. First, the paper discusses the devel-
opment-oriented trade strategy options of low-income
countries and relates these to the multilateral trade
negotiation process (in section II). It explores the
considerable tension that continues to exist between,
on the one hand, what the initial conditions and the
development needs of the low-income countries ap-
pear to require in the area of trade policy and, on the
other hand, the trends towards a global convergence
of trade and trade-related policies implicit in the in-
creasingly globalization-driven multilateral trading
system. This section of the paper also examines what
mechanisms exist in the multilateral trading system
for protecting the development dimension of trade
policy and for ensuring that countries at different
levels of development can effectively pursue their
interests within the WTO framework. In particular,
it reviews the concept and operationalization of the
principle of “special and differential treatment”
(SDT) as a viable vehicle through which the multi-3 Interests and Options of Developing and Least-developed Countries in a New Round of MTNs
lateral trading system can accommodate the devel-
opment needs of the low-income countries.
Section III identifies and discusses the areas of
possible negotiation that are of greatest interest to
the developing and least-developed countries. The
preservation and enhancement of market access for
their exports of goods and services constitute the
areas of greatest interests for these countries in the
context of the Millennium Round. The key market
access questions are therefore identified and dis-
cussed in relation to agriculture, manufactures, tex-
tile and clothing as well as services. In particular,
the major market access issues in the area of goods
relate to tariff peaks and tariff escalation; while in
the area of services, the primary focus is on the move-
ment of natural persons – the key services supply
mode in which the exploitation of the comparative
advantage of low-income countries appears to be
quite substantial and most heavily hampered. Mar-
ket access negotiations have two sides, of course.
Therefore, this section not only discusses market
access for the exports of the developing and least-
developed countries but also suggests what “conces-
sions” they can (and should) offer in return. In other
words, this section is explicit about reciprocity.
In section IV, the paper’s focus shifts to a con-
sideration of the areas likely to be included in future
multilateral trade negotiations that pose the greatest
difficulty for the developing and least-developed
countries. These areas are associated, in this paper,
with the increasing intrusiveness of multilateral trade
disciplines that is particularly evident in the reduc-
tion of the domestic policy autonomy of low-income
countries in the broadly defined domain of domestic
regulatory systems. This section makes the follow-
ing points. The low-income countries are unlikely to
be able to fully realize their potential market access
benefits if the use of a range of capacity-building
and development-enhancing trade-related policy
measures, which remain important for their capacity
building and development, is further constrained in
the forthcoming negotiations. The evolution and in-
creasing sophistication of certain regulations and
standards constitute an integral part – and are there-
fore not independent of – the development process.
Attempts to impose “policy convergence” in these
areas on the low-income countries in the context of
future trade negotiations will cause severe imple-
mentation and compliance problems. In particular,
changes that require substantial, time-consuming and
resource-intensive human and institutional capacity-
building efforts may need to be accompanied with
mandatory financial and technical assistance, since
UR-type “transitional periods” will be largely inap-
propriate and probably impossible to pre-determine
with a reasonable degree of accuracy. In any case, to
the extent that the capacity to take on some of the
full obligation in these areas is largely determined
by a country’s wealth, appropriate development-re-
lated thresholds may be preferred to rather arbitrary
time limits.
Section V takes up the paper’s last question i.e.
what are the ways in which developing and least de-
veloped countries can enhance the effectiveness of
their participation in the new round of multilateral
trade negotiations? Actually, this section expands the
question in two directions: it discusses participation
in the WTO process generally; and it explores how
the WTO system can (and should) help the develop-
ing and least-developed countries to help themselves.
Identification and analysis of the key competencies
required for effective participation in the WTO proc-
ess as well as the key mechanisms through which
they are exercised set the stage for articulating how
these countries can enhance the effectiveness of their
participation. Certain changes with respect to the
WTO governance and management structures are
suggested as ways of ensuring that the concerns of
low-income members are given greater prominence
in the organization’s activities. The paper concludes
in section VI.
II. Trade policy and strategy for
development
Much of the analysis of trade policy and strat-
egy for development from the perspective of
low-income countries appears to be motivated largely
by two basic concerns. These relate to how their trade
policies can be used to promote their economic
growth and development, and how the global
economy and developments therein impinge on their
prospects for growth and development. These con-
cerns have become even more pressing in today’s
rapidly globalizing world economy in which inte-
gration into international markets is increasingly held
out as an important and indispensable growth vehi-
cle which cannot be ignored by the low-income
countries. It is regularly cited, in this context, that
virtually all the countries that have been successful
in achieving significant rates of economic growth
since the 1960s are the ones that have utilized avail-
able trade opportunities, while those countries that
have erected barriers against trade appear to have
fallen behind in terms of economic growth and de-4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 2
velopment (see, for example, Krueger, 1995). A
strand of the mainstream literature pushes this point
further to suggest that the developing countries that
achieved spectacular growth over this period are
those that adopted outward-oriented development
strategies focusing specifically on the promotion of
exports.
The lesson drawn from this is that open econo-
mies grow more rapidly than closed ones and, hence,
that all low-income countries need to open up to
world trade in order to stimulate their economic
growth. In other words, if these countries open up
to international trade by substantially reducing
their domestic trade barriers, this would contribute
significantly to their overall economic growth per-
formance. Central to this strategy are two basic
propositions. First is that a robust, diversified and
rapidly growing external sector is generally associ-
ated with rapid overall economic growth. Second is
the argument that trade liberalization which gener-
ates a neutral or outward-oriented trade regime
confers certain productivity-enhancing and growth-
promoting features on the liberalized economy
(World Bank, 1991). These derive from several
sources; including improvement in the efficiency with
which resources are allocated, increase in competi-
tion and product specification, enhanced ability of
the economy to stimulate domestic and attract for-
eign investments, and enhancement of the technology
transfer environment whether this occurs through
the import of capital goods that embody current
technology, as an integral part of foreign direct in-
vestment, or through increased competition that
induces exporters to operate at or close to the fron-
tiers of “best practice” management and technology.
Analyses relating these ideas to the African
experience have typically concluded that greater
“openness” would be necessary before a regime of
more rapid economic growth could be established
and sustained in the region. Several points are made
to justify this conclusion. First, although African
countries have made considerable progress in reduc-
ing their average effective tariffs, especially during
the last 15 years or so (World Bank, 1994; Oyejide
et al., 1999), this region continues to maintain the
most restrictive trade regime in the world. Similarly,
Ng and Yeats (1996: 25) conclude that African “trade
barriers are far more restrictive than” elsewhere in
the world; noting, in particular, that Africa’s aver-
age tariff of 26.8 per cent (in 1995) was more than
three times higher than those of a selected set of “fast
growing exporters” and, in addition, that the differ-
ence between African trade barriers and those of other
regions has widened considerably since the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Second
there seems to be some support from empirical evi-
dence to the effect that Africa’s lack of openness is
the largest contributor to the region’s dismal eco-
nomic growth performance, especially since the
mid-1970s (Sachs and Warner, 1997). Third, Collier
and Gunning (1999) argue that the same level of trade
restrictions has done more damage in Africa than
elsewhere, primarily because of the relatively small
size of most African economies.
If openness (defined broadly as the freer and
more rapid flow of goods, people, capital and knowl-
edge across national borders) does generate economic
growth world-wide, then a key rationale for the mul-
tilateral trading system, as an arrangement through
which enhanced openness is ensured, would be to
promote the growth of the economies of all partici-
pating countries. In this sense, it would be legitimate
to think of the multilateral trading system as a part-
nership for development through trade implicit in
which is the expectation that participation will be
mutually rewarding to all parties.
But, as it turns out, things are not necessarily
quite so straightforward and clear cut. In other words,
the postulated relationship between openness and
economic growth remains subject to debate. In par-
ticular, the conventional claim that Africa’s lack of
openness is primarily responsible for the region’s
marginalization in the world market (Amjadi, Reinke
and Yeats, 1996) has been challenged. For instance,
Rodrik (1997) and Coe and Hoffmaister (1998) show
that Africa’s relatively low level of bilateral trade
with other regions mainly is due to the relatively small
size of the average African economy and the rela-
tively low rates of their economic growth over the
last two to three decades. According to Ndulu and
Ndung’u (1997: 21), an analysis of the African ex-
perience suggests that “trade and trade policies affect
growth and growth in turn affects trade performance”;
but “growth performance is key to successful link
between export and growth”. More generally, Rodrik
(1999) finds no convincing evidence to suggest that
a country’s economic performance is strongly and
systematically enhanced by its openness to trade,
when that is indicated by low barriers to trade and
capital flows; he indicates more specifically that the
relationship between growth rates and various indi-
cators of openness, such as controls on capital flows
and levels of tariff and non-tariff barriers, is weak,
at best. Along the same lines, Stiglitz (1999: 36) af-
firms that “trade liberalisation, while necessary, is
not sufficient for developing countries to reap the full5 Interests and Options of Developing and Least-developed Countries in a New Round of MTNs
benefits from integration with the world economy”.
Put slightly differently, a liberalized trade regime
would not, on its own, place an economy on a self-
sustained growth path.
Furthermore, it remains unclear how far a coun-
try must open up if it wishes to grow rapidly and at
what level of development would a particular degree
of openness yield the desired result in terms of ex-
port expansion and overall economic growth. In
summarizing the debate on this point, Collier and
Gunning (1999:14) offer the following conclusion:
“the international growth literature has reached a
consensus that … tight trade restrictions are damag-
ing, but controversy continues over the effects of
more moderate trade restrictions”. There is, however,
much more robust evidence that the composition of
exports matters in relation to growth. More specifi-
cally, experience shows that developing countries
with greater manufactured exports growth tend to
grow faster than those relying primarily on exports
of primary commodities, regardless of the stance of
their trade regime. A plausible explanation for this
may be that openness to trade is relatively more
growth inducing for the developing countries that
have already succeeded in establishing an efficient
and competitive manufacture base prior to a deeper
liberalization of their trade regimes.
The degree of openness that may be desired for
the purpose of achieving full integration into the glo-
bal economy, for whatever reason, is one thing while
the extent of liberalization of the trade regime that
may be feasible, given an economy’s basic charac-
teristics is quite another. Given the current level of
development of many low-income countries, there
are, at least, two important considerations that could
limit the extent of trade liberalization. One reason
emanates from the use of import protection as a
means of establishing an industrial base and the other
relates to revenue generation. The first remains con-
troversial, after much debate. The point of view that
appears to broadly reflect developing country per-
spectives is articulated by Rodrik (1992: 312) as
follows: “the case for import protection on industri-
alisation grounds rests on a number of ill-fitting,
second-best rationales. On balance, the arguments
weigh in favour of import protection… Moreover,
the arguments are strongest for the poorest countries
with least access to direct tax/subsidy instruments”.
Furthermore, given the existence a certain level
of import protection, a rapid and radical reduction
of tariff rates could be problematic, since the result-
ing loss of output generated by tariff reduction may
not be immediately compensated for by comparable
surge in the output of the non-protected sectors of
the economy. Mussa (1997) suggests that this could
well be the case in many African (and, presumably,
other low-income) countries where the industrial
sector is not only narrow but also highly dependent
on tariff protection.
The revenue objective of trade taxes constitutes,
perhaps, an even more binding constraint on the
extent of realistic trade liberalization in many low-
income countries. This constraint is clearly more
serious in the case of the least developed countries.
Africa, which contains the largest proportion of least-
developed countries, depends more heavily on trade
taxes for fiscal revenues than any other region of the
world. Although trade taxes as a proportion of total
tax revenue declined in Africa from over 40 per cent
in the mid-1970s to just over 30 per cent in the mid-
1990s, Africa’s relative dependence has remained
much higher than that of the Asia-Pacific region
(24 per cent) and Latin America and the Caribbean
region (21 per cent); while the dependence of devel-
oping countries is several multiples of the 2 per cent
for the OECD countries (IMF, 1997). Both the struc-
ture of a country’s economy and its level of economic
development are major determinants of the country’s
degree of reliance on international trade taxes; this
largely explains why developing and least – devel-
oped countries often find themselves obliged to
depend on trade taxes as an important source of rev-
enue. In these circumstances, “it will be only over
the long term, as domestic productive capacity (and
hence the domestic tax base) grows and broadens
and as administrative capacities improve that a ma-
jor shift from reliance on international trade taxation
to a reliance on domestic taxation would be expected
to occur” (IMF, 1997: 2).
Broadly consistent with the discussion above,
Mussa (1997: 10) concludes that “for practical rea-
sons, it may be assumed that tariff rates will be posi-
tive for purposes of domestic protection and to
generate revenue” in may African and other low –
income countries. In addition, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that the average tariff rates in these countries
will be higher than those of the high-income coun-
tries. While economic theory does not directly pro-
vide a magic formula for determining the appropriate
degree of trade restrictions that would achieve both
protection and revenue objectives in the context of
medium-term growth strategies for the low-income
countries, there are interesting proposals in the lit-
erature. One which seems to be more directly rooted
in the prevailing conditions in many low-income6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 2
countries suggests that “a range of 10–50 percent for
average protection is not unreasonable”, and that
“poor countries (especially those in Africa) should
probably go to the high end of this range”, although
countries susceptible to smuggling should have lower
rates (Rodrik, 1992: 313). It is interesting to note that
the indicators of “openness” used in Sachs and
Warner (1997) include a 40 per cent tariff rate thresh-
old and 40 per cent non-tariff barriers coverage. Thus,
the strict trade policy component of “openness”
seems consistent with fairly reasonable industrial
protection and revenue generation tariff levels that
may be appropriate for low-income countries.
The broad contours of a development-oriented
trade policy for low-income countries can be sketched
in terms of the consensus which Rodrik (1998: 12)
expresses as follows: “de-monopolize trade; stream-
line the import regime, reduce red tape and implement
transparent customs procedures; replace quantitative
restrictions with tariffs; avoid extreme variation in
tariff rates and excessively high rates of effective
protection, allow exporters duty-free access to im-
ported inputs; refrain from large doses of anti-export
bias; do not tax exports too highly”. Further elabora-
tion may be useful with regard to some elements of
this consensus. First, the reduction of tariffs to mod-
est levels (such as the range of 10–30 per cent) appear
to be within easy reach of achievement for virtually
all low-income countries. This range of tariffs should
enable the typical low-income country to satisfy both
its revenue raising and industrial protection objec-
tives while, at the same time, limiting the relative
price distortions that trade restrictions can create and
hence the damage they can do to the overall economy.
In addition, the import protection component should
be strictly limited, time-bound and related to some
clearly understood and measurable performance
standard (Stiglitz, 1996). The entire tariff structure
should be fairly simple, reflecting a limited number
of tariff rates to ensure greater transparency.
Second, the export component of trade policy
deserves special attention. Good export performance
is not just a desirable goal in its own right, it is also
a critical means to other important ends such as
deeper import liberalization and more robust eco-
nomic growth. A successful and sustainable import
liberalization programme requires successful exports.
As Michaely (1991: 123) points out, “the survival of
trade liberalization attempts tend strongly to be re-
lated to a favourable export performance, whereas
the collapse of trade liberalization is overwhelmingly
connected with a dismal export performance”. The
policy measures that endow a trade regime with an
element of import protectiveness inevitably also im-
pose an anti-export bias. It is well established that
import restrictions effectively translate into a tax on
exports which, in turn, has the effect of reducing the
international competitiveness of the export sector.
To promote exports, this anti-export bias must be
neutralized by implementing schemes that grant ex-
porters and their suppliers unrestricted access to
inputs at internationally competitive prices that are
free of import duty and other indirect taxes.
Third, mechanisms must be devised that would
endow the trade policy and strategy of low-income
countries with greater predictability and credibility,
and thus ensure that whatever policy changes are
implemented are perceived as being credible by pri-
vate agents. Given the largely irreversible nature of
investment decisions, it is critically important for the
trade regime to be predictable and stable if appropri-
ate investment and export supply responses are to be
elicited from private agents. This issue is of particu-
lar importance in Africa where trade reform attempts
have suffered from lack of credibility due to frequent
policy reversals (Oyejide et al., 1999). This phenom-
enon seems to be largely explained by lack of
effective restraints on governmental policy discre-
tion which, in turn, gives room for frequent changes
in trade policy. In the absence of an effective mecha-
nism for locking in reform, trade policy reversals may
be largely unavoidable. Yet, many low-income coun-
tries may face considerable difficulty in establishing
viable and effective domestic agencies of restraint,
given the fragile nature of their governance institu-
tions. Hence, the search for an effective mechanism
for ensuring the credibility of trade policy in low-
income countries could inevitably extend to external
institutions such as the WTO. In the WTO frame-
work, tariff bindings help to lock-in progress on the
domestic front and are useful in warding off local
lobbies that may be seeking further protection. These
internationally registered tariff bindings then become
an important mechanism for imparting credibility to
a country’s trade regime.
In addition to its use as an agency of trade policy
restraint, the analysis of trade policy and strategy for
the development of low-income countries suggest
other important implications for the WTO as a frame-
work within which rules are established for mediating
multilateral trade relations. First, it is clear that the
low-income developing countries will maintain trade
restrictions as well as industrial and export support
measures that re likely to be higher and exhibit wider
sectoral dispersion than those prevailing in the de-
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elements of the development strategy of low-income
countries the rule and norms of the multilateral trad-
ing system should explicitly recognize and permit
the consequent asymmetry of obligations, within the
WTO framework, between the low-income and de-
veloped countries. What this asymmetry reflects is
essentially the higher costs to developing countries than
the developed countries – in terms of adjustment and
capacity building – of trade liberalization (Stiglitz,
1999). Second, the low-income countries cannot op-
timize their benefits from the multilateral trading
system as “free riders”. They can and should accept
greater and more transparent multilateral discipline
on their trade policies and other capacity building
support measures in the context of the asymmetry of
obligations noted above. This can be associated with
at least three advantages. It could provide the basis
for using the WTO as an effective agency of restraint
for enhancing the credibility of their trade policy, as
discussed above. It could protect individual low-in-
come countries from “unbound” unilateral actions
of more powerful trading partners. It should also
encourage low-income countries to pursue more
growth-enhancing trade and trade-related policies.
The multilateral trading system is made up of
countries at markedly different levels of development.
The analysis above suggests that the development-
oriented trade policy and strategy that may be
regarded as appropriate for the low-income countries
are also markedly different from those of the devel-
oped countries and that the multilateral trading
system would need to recognize the consequent asym-
metry of obligations within the WTO framework and,
hence, create a mechanism for this purpose. All of
this is not new, of course. A number of inter-related
ideas and pressures, some dating back to the early
1950s, gave birth to the concept of “special and dif-
ferential treatment” (SDT) of developing countries
in the global trading system (Hudec, 1987, Wolf,
1987, Oyejide, 1998). Prominent among these were
the recognition by the developed country members
of GATT that the trade and development problems
of their developing country counterparts were, in
certain ways, fundamentally different from their own;
the widening gap (as measured by standard indicators
such as income per capita) between the developed
and developing countries; and the continuing desire
on the part of the developed countries to keep the
developing countries within the framework of mul-
tilateral trade rules.
The framework for SDT was formally set out
during the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade nego-
tiations. In principle, SDT provisions were meant to
take account of the diversity of conditions and ca-
pacities in various member countries. In explicitly
acknowledging the disparities among members and
the growing divergence in the economic situation and
capacities of different countries SDT provisions
sought to relate them to the benefits that different
countries could reap from the multilateral trading
system and the obligations and commitments that they
would be expected to undertake. Basically and in their
original forms, SDT provisions were designed to
enhance market access conditions of beneficiary
countries and permit them derogation from certain
multilateral trade disciplines. Thus, in addition
to granting certain trade preferences, some SDT
provisions allowed the beneficiary countries some
flexibility in the use of various trade and trade-
related measures. This derogation from rules was to
ensure that the beneficiary countries were not de-
prived of the essential tools for strengthening their
competitive supply capacity without which they
would not be able to take full advantage of the pref-
erential market access granted to them. Hence, the
two key elements of SDT provisions are essentially
complementary; special capacity-building measures
would, to the extent that they enhance output and
export supply response, enable beneficiary countries
take fuller advantage of special market access pref-
erences.
The UR agreements have radically changed both
the form and content of most of the key SDT provi-
sions. Many post-UR SDT provisions are expressed
in terms of transitional periods, differences in thresh-
old levels and non-mandatory offers of technical
assistance to fulfil specific obligations rather than in
the form of substantive exemptions from specific
rules, as in the pre-UR era. Furthermore, the length
of transitional periods and the level at which thresh-
olds have been set appear, for the most part, to have
been selected in an ad hoc and haphazard way. In
particular, they do not appear to be closely linked to
or explicable in terms of any objectively determined
set of criteria reflecting differences in levels of devel-
opment or country institutional and human capacities.
The specified transitional periods appear to be ex-
cessively optimistic in many cases.
Policy and rule changes can impose different
types of costs on an economy. One of these is the
cost of adjustment, others include costs of implemen-
tation and compliance. A change in the tariff rate,
for example, should be associated with minimal im-
plementation and compliance costs; although the
adjustment cost could be high if it is a large change
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riod. A long transitional (implementation) period
could be a way of reducing (or perhaps spreading
out) the cost of adjustment. By comparison, a change
which mandates increased protection of intellectual
property rights could impose high costs of imple-
mentation, compliance and adjustment, since it would
involve human and institutional capacity-building for
implementation and compliance in addition to the
cost of adjustment. In such a case, the use of transi-
tional period is, by itself, neither fully appropriate
nor adequate for taking account of the full costs in-
volved. These considerations suggest that the limited
duration of many of the transitional periods used to
reflect some SDT “concessions” in the UR agree-
ments renders them inadequate and inappropriate as
a basis for capacity creation for enhanced trade and
production. Contrary to the realities on the ground
in many low-income countries, both the use of and
the limited duration of the transitional periods ap-
pear to assume the existence of the appropriate
human, institutional and resource capacities required
to enable these countries carry out their WTO obli-
gations and take maximum advantage of the potential
opportunities provided by the multilateral trading
system.
The deficiencies of the post-UR SDT provisions
point to the need for a careful re-thinking of the origi-
nal concept, its form and content, prior to the
negotiations on specific sectors and rules during the
Millennium Round. This is an issue of significant
strategic importance whose neglect during the UR
may be largely responsible for the patch-work na-
ture of the resulting post-UR SDT provisions. Better
informed and multilaterally negotiated decisions re-
garding SDT forms and contents taken before the
sectoral and rules negotiations begin could more
appropriately guide these negotiations and ensure that
the previously agreed SDT guidelines are subse-
quently reflected both in the reviews of existing
agreements, negotiation of new agreements and ar-
ticulation of new rules. It is necessary, in particular,
to negotiate and reach multilateral agreement re-
garding the classification of WTO members, the
measurable development, trade and other parameters
to be used in classifying countries, and the rules for
which full or partial derogation might be granted as
a means of enhancing the supply capacity of benefi-
ciary countries.
The WTO recognizes three categories of mem-
bers, i.e. developed, developing, and least-developed.
However, while it indirectly defines one category (i.e.
the least-developed countries) the criteria for sepa-
rating members into the different categories remain
controversial and not fully transparent. While the
WTO seems to have adopted the United Nations’
definition of the least-developed country, it fails to
acknowledge the deficiencies (including the politi-
cal nature) of the UN definition. In particular, the
UN definition is not designed to reflect trade com-
petitiveness which is or should be an important
concern of the WTO. But even on the basis of its
largely income-based definition, the UN’s list of
least-developed countries excludes several low-
income countries that should have been included. In
an attempt, perhaps, to remedy the inherent defi-
ciency of the UN list, the UR agreement on subsidies
actually expanded the UN’s list of least-developed
countries to include several other countries with per
capita income of up to US$1000. This was, how-
ever, an ad hoc solution that was not extended to
other UR agreements in which specific SDT provi-
sions referred to least-developed countries.
An even greater ambiguity exists over the
question of which of the WTO members are the de-
veloping countries. In the absence of a specific
definition or an agreed set of criteria for identifying
this group, the WTO appears to operate under an
implicit self- designation arrangement which allows
countries to describe themselves as developing coun-
tries. However, the increasing references in WTO
discussions to the so-called “more advanced” devel-
oping countries may signal the beginnings of possible
contention in future trade disputes. In addition, the
unilateral decision by certain developed countries to
“graduate” some developing countries out of trade
preferences points in the same direction. It seems
clear, therefore that the WTO cannot for too long
continue to dodge the issue of negotiating an appro-
priate set of criteria for categorizing its member
countries for the purpose of determining their eligi-
bility for certain SDT “concessions”.
An explicit categorization of WTO member
countries based on a set of measurable criteria could
also address a second problem i.e. how countries are
graduated out of particular SDT provisions. The UR
agreement on subsidies provides an example. By
categorizing beneficiary countries in terms of per
capita income, that agreement was able to express
“graduation” in terms of measurable economic indi-
cators (i.e. exceeding a specified per capita income
over three consecutive years or achieving a speci-
fied export market share) rather than in terms of
transitional period as in other agreements. In other
words, when country classifications are based on
measurable economic criteria, a country’s gradua-
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particular category becomes automatic when the
country’s indicators exceed those of that category.
There are clearly many different economic (in-
come, trade, etc.) indicators that can be used for
dividing WTO members into the three explicitly rec-
ognized categories of developed, developing, and
least-developed countries. These indicators can ob-
viously be used singly or in some combination. For
example, if a simple, income-based indicator is con-
sidered adequate, the World Bank’s classification of
countries into low-income, middle-income, and high-
income countries would be an obvious choice; it
appears to be determined in a transparent way and
seems to enjoy wide acceptability. It may be useful,
in addition to include a measure of trade competi-
tiveness. For this purpose, manufactured exports
share of total exports of 20 per cent may be suggested
as the dividing line between the least-developed and
the developing countries.
It may be, perhaps, more contentious to iden-
tify and negotiate the rules for which full or partial
derogation should be granted to the least-developed
and developing country categories. But the pre-UR
situation provides a useful starting point, just as does
the idea that the least-developed countries should be
granted complete derogation. However, even the least
developed countries can and should take on some
obligations (such as tariff binding and reduction)
which would commit them to rational and sound trade
policy conducive to their own economic develop-
ment.
Special market access, through trade prefer-
ences, has been an important component of SDT.
While its actual benefits have fallen far short of the
potential due to its many limitations (UNCTAD,
1995) and while further negotiated tariff reductions
on a most-favoured-nation (mfn) basis will continue
to erode preferential trade margins, its continued
importance should not be under-estimated. In par-
ticular, it could provide an important boost to the
exports of the least-developed countries if current
limitations regarding product coverage and rules of
origin could be eliminated. The proposal to grant duty
and quota-free and bound access for all exports of
the least-developed countries to the developed coun-
try markets would amount to an elimination of these
limitations; it would substantially enhance the ex-
port prospects of the least-developed countries
without imposing any significant “cost” to the de-
veloped countries, given the rather low share of the
total export market accounted for by the least-devel-
oped countries.
This proposal should be taken a little further.
One way of doing this is for the developing coun-
tries to also offer special market access to the
least-developed countries, not necessarily on the
same duty-and-quota-free basis as the developed
countries but perhaps at up to 50 per cent of the ap-
plied tariff rates of the developing countries. Again,
the “cost” to the developing countries is unlikely to
be particularly burdensome. Yet, the gesture could
be a valuable way not only for demonstrating “South
solidarity” but also to dilute the impression that it is
only the developed countries that are always being
asked to carry the “burden” of all special arrange-
ments required to enable the multilateral trading
system accommodate the needs of its different cat-
egories of members.
III. Market access interests and options
Multilateral negotiations concerning market
access issues in the next round will probably focus
on the key sectors of agriculture, industry and serv-
ices. This sectoral focus will occur in spite of the
fact that there may well be trade-offs across sectors.
The inclusion of the industrial sector presumes that,
although it is not specified in the “build-in agenda”,
the sector should, eventually find its way into the
negotiations. The other two key sectors, i.e. agricul-
ture and services are prominent in the “built-in
agenda” and can therefore be regarded as predeter-
mined candidates for the forthcoming negotiations.
This section briefly reviews the UR agreements on
these sectors, examines their implementation expe-
rience and identifies what the broad negotiating
interests of the developing and least-developed coun-
tries are likely to be with respect to each of these
three sectors. An analysis of the negotiating options
of these countries should go beyond identification
of their interests, of course. It should, in addition
cover strategies issues relating to what they may wish
to offer during the negotiations as well as what kinds
of coalitions may need to be built around the issues
that they consider to be particularly important.
A. Agriculture
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(AoA) focuses essentially on several key features of
agricultural policy in the developed countries, which
have constituted problems for world trade in agri-
cultural products. To the extent that the AoA10 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 2
addresses itself to such features as high levels of pro-
tection and export subsidy, it can be said that its
primary concern relates to agricultural policy reforms
viewed from the perspective of the developed coun-
tries whose agricultural policies are characterized by
these features. By implication, it seems clear that
AoA does not directly address the agricultural policy
reform issues in the developing and least-developed
countries. In the case of the developed countries, high
levels of protection and subsidy have typically gen-
erated excess production from a decreasing number
of farm units. But in the case of many developing
and least-developed countries, both macroeconomic
and sectoral policies have typically discouraged ag-
riculture as a whole and agricultural exports, in
particular (Krueger et al., 1988). In the low-income
countries, the primary goal of policy reform (articu-
lated and implemented largely through structural
adjustment programmes) tends to be the elimination
of bias against agriculture with a view to achieving
a number of goals, including raising agricultural
productivity, raising the level of domestic food pro-
duction, and diversifying agricultural output and
export by promoting new crops and processing pri-
mary commodities. In other words, the basic goals of
agricultural policy reform in the low-income countries
are to increase and diversify agricultural production
and exports; goals which compare rather sharply with
the implicit goal of AoA, which is to curb excess
agricultural production and export by eliminating the
policy distortions which generate this excess.
To make these distinctions is not necessarily to
imply that AoA has no or little relevance for the de-
veloping and least-developed countries. In fact, high
levels of agricultural support, protection and subsidy
in the developed countries affect the low-income
countries in several ways, not all of them negatively.
First, these agricultural policies of the developed
countries increase supplies to the world market and,
hence, depress world market prices. This is not a bad
result, of course, for the food-deficit low-income
countries. But low world market prices generally
make it more difficult for agricultural producers in
many developing and least-developed countries to
compete internationally and even in their own home
markets. As a result, their agricultural production
incentives are reduced which could, in turn, have the
effect of slowing the development of their agricul-
tural sector. Clearly, both categories of low-income
countries have a stake in the reduction of domestic
agricultural support and export subsidies in the de-
veloped counties, but for quite different reasons. Such
a reduction is likely to raise the food import bill for
the low-income food deficit countries; at the same
time; it will enhance the market access of the second
category of developing and least-developed countries
both internationally and in the developed country
markets.
The AoA not only laid the foundations for the
reduction of agricultural production and export sub-
sidies but it has also achieved some significant
results. Perhaps the most important of these is the
firm subjection of domestic agricultural policies to
multilateral discipline for the first time and the es-
tablishment of the basic principle that agricultural
commodities can (and should) be treated like manu-
factured products under the rules of the multilateral
trading system. In addition, the AoA mandated the
tariffication of all non-tariff barriers on agriculture,
committed all WTO members to 100 per cent bind-
ing of agricultural tariffs as well as a phased reduction
of bound tariffs on agricultural products, agricultural
production support and export subsidies.
These achievements notwithstanding, what the
AoA accomplished is essentially the beginnings of a
process of improving multilateral discipline on and
liberalizing world agricultural trade which clearly has
a long way to go. As a recent study (Anderson et al.,
1999) shows, beyond 2005, the developed countries
will continue to subsidize agricultural production and
exports while the developing and least-developed
countries will continue to tax both. More specifically,
at the end of the implementation period of the AoA,
average tariff on agricultural products in the devel-
oped countries will still be as high as 36 per cent,
compared to 20 per cent in the developing countries;
while agricultural production subsidy in developed
countries will average 7 per cent compared to an
average production tax of 2 per cent in the develop-
ing countries. With respect to agricultural exports,
the tax imposed by the developing countries will
average 2 per cent, while the developed countries
will provide subsidies averaging as much as 7 per
cent. This establishes the point that the full imple-
mentation of AoA will not result in the elimination
of significant distortions to agricultural production
and trade. The recognition that more needs to be done
constitutes the justification for further negotiations.
Article XX of AoA reflects this recognition by
mandating that new negotiations be initiated by
1 January 2000. The new negotiations are to seek
further commitments, from WTO members, neces-
sary for achieving the long-term objective of
substantial progressive reduction in agricultural sup-
port and protection with a view to the establishment
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system”. In addition, the new negotiations are to take
into account the experience with the implementation
of the reduction commitments mandated by the AoA,
the effects of the implemented reduction commit-
ments on world trade in agriculture, as well as the
non-trade concerns and special and differential treat-
ment for developing and least-developed countries.
The discussions preceding the new negotiations
on agriculture have thrown up a number of issues.
First is what to do about tariffs. Questions relate to
the ways and means of reducing the existing tariff
peaks and eliminating tariff escalation. In addition,
there are concerns about the tariff quota system and
its administration. Second is what to do about agri-
cultural production support. In particular, discussions
point to the need to eliminate “blue box” measures
and revise the criteria for the “green box” measures.
Third is what to do about agricultural export subsi-
dies.
The fourth broad area of concern relates to the
incorporation of the special needs and conditions of
developing countries in market access disciplines,
including the fullest liberalization of trade in tropi-
cal agricultural products and the food security
concerns of the low-income food-deficit countries.
Also included in this broad area is the question of
the concrete follow-up actions on the Ministerial
Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible
Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-
Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing
Countries. Finally, there is a range of other issues,
which will be negotiated. Included in these are the
disciplines on state trading enterprises; export cred-
its export credit guarantees or export insurance
programmes (which could be used to circumvent any
agricultural export subsidy commitments).
From the perspectives of many low-income
countries, the primary objectives to aim for in the
new negotiations on agricultural should include the
following:
• Substantial reduction in agricultural tariff pro-
tection in the developed countries, possibly to
the levels applied to manufactures;
• Achievement of this reduction in agricultural
protection in such a way that tariff peaks are
substantially reduced and tariff escalation elimi-
nated;
• Elimination of agricultural production support
and agricultural export subsidies in the devel-
oped countries;
• Application of SDT provisions for least-devel-
oped and developed countries with respect to
tariff reduction and the use of agricultural pro-
duction and export support measures; and
• Concrete operationalization of the special as-
sistance programme for the least-developed and
net food-importing developing countries nega-
tively affected by the global liberalization of
agriculture.
The specific proposals meant to address these
negotiating objectives deserve some elaboration.
Above quota bound tariffs are very high in all coun-
tries (Ingco, 1996). This results from a combination
of two factors; i.e. dirty tariffication by developed
countries and the adoption of very high ceiling bind-
ings by developing and least-developed countries.
Thus, bound tariffs are as high as 50 to 250 per cent.
It is clear that achieving the objective of increased
market access will require substantial tariff reduc-
tions. In doing this, however, it is in the interest of
low-income countries to ensure that not only is there
a sharp reduction in overall tariff rates, the liberali-
zation process also carries with it a reduction in peak
tariffs and an elimination of tariff escalation. To
achieve these latter two elements of the objective, it
is necessary to adopt a tariff cutting formula in which
the rate of reduction for each product is higher the
greater is the product’s tariff level. This is the “Swiss
Formula”. In other words, there should be a fairly
large across-the-board reduction in tariffs, while the
Swiss Formula should be used to implement the
agreed tariff reductions.
The second element of market access relates to
in-quota tariffs. The negotiation position that would
enhance the objective of increased market access for
the low-income countries would be to eliminate tar-
iff rate quotas or substantially expand them and, in
addition bind in-quota tariffs at the same rate as the
average tariffs applicable to manufactured products.
As the above quota tariffs are reduced and com-
pressed and as the tariff rate quotas are expanded,
the aggregate tariff level should eventually approxi-
mate that applicable to manufactured products.
The ultimate objective of the reform process in
agriculture is to at least place it on the same level
with the manufacturing sector. This suggests that
production support for agriculture in the developed
countries should be further constrained and ulti-
mately eliminated. In doing this, at least three
proposal need to be negotiated. These include the
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ening of the “green box” criteria so that they will not
provide loopholes for illegal output-increasing sup-
port measures; and further reductions (by at least 50
per cent) in aggregate measures of support (AMS).
Bringing agriculture in line with the manufacturing
sector requires the prohibition of agricultural export
subsides. It also requires tighter disciplines on the
use of such measures as export credit guarantees and
insurance.
The existing AoA does not, in the view of many
developing and least-developed countries, fully re-
flect their non-trade concerns. Yet, a fairly strong
case can be made that the least-developed and de-
veloping countries require considerable flexibility to
pursue certain non-trade objectives, given the multi-
functionality of agriculture. Many of these countries
may need some flexibility to provide appropriate
agricultural support needed to alleviate poverty,
maintain the standard of living of the rural popula-
tion, sustain rural employment, improve national food
security, and preserve the environment (FAO, 1997).
In this context and in its sectoral application to
agriculture, the broad SDT provisions articulated in
section II above should be adequate to provide the
domestic policy flexibility needed by the least-de-
veloped and developing countries for addressing their
non-trade concerns. Under these provisions, the least-
developed countries (which will constitute a larger
group than before if the suggested new eligibility
criteria are adopted) will not have to make any re-
duction commitments with respect to market access,
production support, and export subsidies; while the
reduction commitments of developing countries will
be 50 per cent of those applicable to developed coun-
tries and these will be phased-out over twice the
implementation period allowed for developed coun-
tries. In addition, the least-developed countries
should receive bound duty-free and quota-free ac-
cess for their processed and unprocessed agricultural
products into the markets of developed countries as
well as preferential access into the markets of devel-
oping countries.
The AoA makes explicit provisions for assist-
ing the least-developed and net food-importing
developing countries to cope with the effects of im-
plementing the agreement on international food
prices and the effects of reduced subsidies on the
export of food from the developed countries. This
assistance was to take three different forms; i.e. in-
creased food aid, short-term financial assistance to
import food, and technical assistance to improve
agricultural productivity and infrastructure. Neither
the first two short-term assistance measures nor the
third longer term assistance measure are within the
preview of the WTO and the decision that contains
the explicit offer of assistance does not indicate what
operational modalities would be used to believer its
promise.
Meanwhile, the post-UR experience shows
three trends: food aid has fallen rather than increased,
food import bills of the least-developed and net food-
importing countries African have risen, and technical
assistance to improve their agricultural productivity
and infrastructure has declined (Anderson et al.,
1999). It is not necessarily the case that all of the
trends are due entirely to the implementation of AoA,
but a significant part of at least the first two (i.e.
falling food aid and increasing food import bills) is
traceable to it. In particular, there is evidence that
some of the observed increases in food prices de-
rives from the reduction of export subsidies which
has also generated reduced intervention stocks and,
hence, lower food aid volumes. In addition, the ero-
sion suffered by preference receiving countries (most
of which are least-developed and net food-import-
ing developing countries) has worsened ability to
cover their food import bills through increased ex-
port earnings (FAO, 1997). In short, many vulnerable
low-income countries have faced precisely the kind
of difficulties foreseen as a short-term consequence
of the implementation of AoA, but there is no evi-
dence that they have been significantly assisted as
promised.
Africa carriers the major burden of these diffi-
culties. As many as 43 of the region’s 52 countries
fall in the category of low-income food-deficit
countries that have also suffered from significant
preference erosion. Unless the short-term needs for
assistance of these countries can be met, it is likely
that their food consumption will be compromised by
the global agricultural liberalization process. African
countries should therefore insist that the WTO es-
tablish the operational modalities of implementing
the Marrakesh Decision on Measures Concerning the
Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme
on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Devel-
oping Countries.
It is universally recognized that agricultural
markets are inherently volatile. While the conse-
quences of this volatility are not unique to least-
developed and developing countries, it is clear that
the consequences are typically much more serious
for this category of countries. Several factors account
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are more prone to external shocks that usually
amplify the inherent volatility of their agricultural
markets. Second, the agricultural sector plays an
overriding role in their economies, given its close
links with the livelihood of a large segment of the
population.
Safeguard measures could be important in the
context of volatile agriculture and in relation to food
security concerns, particularly when bound tariffs are
quite low. Hence, developing countries may need to
have appropriate safeguard measures written into a
new agreement on agriculture, although this is prob-
ably justifiable with respect to only a limited number
of basic food commodities.
The review of the AoA and the further negotia-
tions it mandates in the context of a new round
provide the opportunity for the developing and least-
developed countries to make demands from the
developed countries regarding the market access
“concessions” itemized above. As indicated earlier,
because the focus of the AoA rests primarily on the
kinds of policy distortions that are prevalent in the
developed countries, it makes very little demand, in
principle, on the developing and least-developed
countries. This is particularly the case with respect
to the two key areas of domestic support for agri-
culture and agricultural export subsidy. However, in
the process of implementing AoA in the areas of
tariffication of non-tariff barriers on agricultural
products and meeting the tariff binding commitments,
the developing and least-developed countries ended
up with very high bound ceiling tariff rates. The re-
sulting situation is not unlike that of the developed
countries whose “dirty” tariffication process also
produced unusually high tariff rates on most agri-
cultural products. In any case, the point is that the
bound tariffs of developing and least-developed coun-
tries on agricultural products are much higher than the
range that may be considered appropriate to enable
them meet their import protection and revenue-
generation objectives. Hence, it may be presumed
that these countries can afford to offer substantial
reduction in their agricultural tariff levels. Such an
offer would enable them provide a degree of reci-
procity for their demands on the developed countries,
create an opportunity for rationalizing their own
agricultural trade policy, and establish a closer rela-
tionship between the applied and bound tariffs as a
means of enhancing the credibility of their trade
policy. In more specific terms, and as suggested in
section II above, it would not be unreasonable for
the developing and least-developed countries to bind
their tariffs at rates not more than 50 per cent. Viewed
as an average, this is still generally higher than the
applied rates in many developing and least-devel-
oped countries and it permits sufficient flexibility
for generating revenue, stabilizing domestic markets
and protecting producers.
B. Services
One of the major results of the UR negotiations
is the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS). This was the product of a process whose
primary goal was to obtain some degree of market
access commitments from as many countries and in
as many of the identified service sectors as possible
(Feketekuty, 1998). In the end, while the UR estab-
lished the basic architecture and structure of GATS
and completed several of its key components, nego-
tiations on a number of sectors and cross-sectoral
issues continued beyond the UR. Included among
these were such sectors as basic telecommunications,
financial services, professional services, and air and
sea transportation; and cross-sectoral issues such as
transparency in government procurement, subsidies,
safeguards, and labour mobility. With particular ref-
erence to the important cross-sectoral issue of labour
mobility, negotiators failed to make substantive
progress on a comprehensive agreement on the tem-
porary entry of service providers during the UR.
Subsequent efforts, after the UR, also failed. Hence,
this and other outstanding questions were pushed to
the new round.
This future round is provided for in Article XIX
of GATS whose broad focus will be to achieve a pro-
gressively higher level of liberalization in all areas
of services. More specifically, the new round of trade
negotiations in services will attempt to eliminate or
reduce all adverse measures which affect trade in
services as a means of providing effective market
access, and complete the unfinished agenda on GATS
rules covering key rule-making areas such as emer-
gency safeguards, government procurement, and
subsidies. In addition, the new round of negotiations
is intended to increase the general level of specific
commitments while promoting the interest of all par-
ticipants on a mutually advantageous basis and
securing an overall balance of rights and obligations.
Furthermore, the specified goals of the proposed new
negotiations will include paying particular attention
to the identification of sectors of export interest to
developing and least-developed countries for which
liberalization could be negotiated. In this context,
the new negotiations will attempt to find ways of14 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 2
facilitating further liberalization commitments on
services through the movement of natural persons.
As in the case of agriculture, the new round of
negotiations on trade in services will be preceded by
an assessment of the implementation of GATS. From
the perspective of the low-income countries, this
implementation review is likely to confirm that these
countries continue to be penalized by undue restric-
tions of the movement of suppliers of services and by
a series of other barriers, including anti-competitive
practices, particularly in air and sea transportation
as well as in professional and business services
(Mashayekhi, 1998). The movement of natural per-
sons faces many barriers and barrier-like formalities
(including visa requirements). Countries tend to im-
pose a wide variety of conditions on the movement
of services providers. These can be broadly catego-
rized into quotas, economic needs test (ENT), and
qualification requirements. ENT involves a services
supplier’s entry into the country where the services
are to be provided being conditioned upon a deter-
mination that no resident or national of the country
is available and qualified to carry out the assignment,
that the job has been advertised, and that the em-
ployment level, wages and other working conditions
are the same as for nationals of the country. In addi-
tion, qualifications and licensing requirements, as
well as the regulations of professional bodies (such
as lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers, medi-
cal practitioners, etc.) impede the entry of foreign
services suppliers due to the non-recognition of their
professional qualifications, burdensome licensing
requirements and imposition of discriminatory stand-
ards. These problems point in the direction of two
broad conclusions that a review of the implementa-
tion experience of GATS is likely to confirm.
First, the special GATS provisions (i.e. Articles
IV and XIX: 2)) which are meant to promote the
increased participation of developing and least-de-
veloped countries have not been fully operationalized
and implemented. There is, in general, no clear
mechanism for implementing the GATS provisions
directed at addressing the specific needs of the low-
income countries with particular reference to
flexibility in the liberalization process and offer to
them of enhanced access to technology, distribution
channels, and information networks. Second, com-
mensurate market access has not been provided to
the low-income countries in the services sectors and
modes of supply that are of particular export interest
to them. This is typified by the lack of meaningful
liberalization with regard to the movement of natu-
ral persons in the absence of commercial presence.
Article IV recognizes the basic asymmetry, in
the area of trade in services, between the high-in-
come and low-income countries. Based on this rec-
ognition, it establishes a number of obligations on
the part of developed countries to extend benefits to
developing and least-developed countries, particu-
larly in three key areas. First, it calls upon the devel-
oped counties to assist the strengthening of the
domestic services capacity of developing and least-
developed countries and its efficiency and competi-
tiveness through access to technology. Second, it
provides for the improvement of the access of devel-
oping and least-developed countries to information
networks. Third, it obligates developed countries to
liberalize access to markets in sectors of export in-
terest to the low-income countries. This applies, in
particular to implementing and enhancing the com-
mitments of developed countries with respect to the
movement of natural persons. These three areas are,
in a sense, closely interrelated. Making GATS Arti-
cle IV effective through enhanced technology trans-
fers would also require complementary measures
involving significant improvements in the commit-
ments by developed countries relating to the move-
ment of natural persons, especially contract personnel
and independent professionals through whom key
technology transfer components would occur.
Developing and least-developed countries could
justifiably point to the existing imbalance and asym-
metry in the treatment of the four modes of supply
of services and how this negatively affects their ex-
port interests. It could be noted, more specifically,
that after concluding agreements in such services
sectors such as basic telecommunications and finan-
cial services – areas in which the developed countries
have clear comparative advantage and hence are pri-
marily of export interest to them – attention should
turn to sectors and modes of supply in which the low-
income countries may be presumed to have an
advantage. To redress this imbalance, the new round
of negotiations should focus on eliminating a range
of barriers against the movement of natural persons.
There are two broad categories of the barriers that
need to be addressed. One relates to economic needs
tests (ENTs) ad the other has to do with professional
qualifications. Both are widely used by many coun-
tries, to qualify their commitments regarding the
movement of natural persons.
Commitments could be enhanced by establish-
ing an ENT Exemption List to cover services sectors
and/or categories of professions for which ENT
would not be used as a barrier against the movement
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term exemptions from visa requirements for service
providers in certain occupations. In the alternative,
countries could create “GATS-visas” to provide au-
tomatic multiple-entry visas for services providers
in certain services sectors and/or categories of occu-
pations. The establishment and progressive expansion
of an ENT Exemption List should ensure greater pre-
dictability of a country’s policy regarding trade in
services through this mode of supply. A similar re-
sult could be obtained through mutual recognition
of certain categories of professional qualifications
and the non-discriminatory application of interna-
tionally established standards.
The WTO negotiating process rests, ultimately,
on the principle of reciprocity. It is to be expected,
therefore, that the low-income countries will be re-
quired to offer some commitments in the new round
of negotiations on trade in services. The challenge
that faces them in this content is to ensure coherence
between their own national development policy ob-
jectives and the new commitments they should offer
in terms of market access and national treatment
(UNCTAD, 1999). In particular, it would make sense
for developing and least-developed countries to of-
fer commitments in those sectors and modes of supply
that could assist in enhancing the efficiency and com-
petitiveness of their domestic services capacity. Key
among these are the services that are critical inputs
into production whose inefficient provision consti-
tutes a tax on the production of the associated goods.
Therefore, services sectors whose efficiency will
improve the infrastructure and means of services
delivery, such as basic telecommunications, energy
supply, and air and maritime transportation deserve
special consideration. In making commitments in
these areas, however, developing and least-developed
countries should bear in mind that attaining efficiency
is not just a matter of liberalizing international trade
barriers but also of instituting an appropriate domes-
tic regulatory framework; without the latter, the
efficiency benefits of the former may not be (fully)
realized (Mattoo, 1999).
Market access negotiations on trade in services
may be facilitated by the adoption a “formula” ap-
proach through which countries would agree to
eliminate or reduce by a given percentage certain
types of market access restrictions, such as quotas,
citizenship requirements, limitations on the activi-
ties of locally established foreign-owned enterprises,
etc. (Feketekuty, 1998). But the establishment of
separate targets, through this “formula” for devel-
oped, developing, and least-developed countries
would probably not be necessary. This is because
the GATS has established a built-in approach to SDT
that is unique and quite different from the one (which
is essentially “add on”) used in other UR agreements.
In particular, the GATS structure provides for the
integration of the development dimension into virtu-
ally all elements of the agreement through three
innovative mechanisms. First, market access and
national treatment are negotiated concessions relat-
ing to specific services sector or subsector. Second,
the negotiated commitments are based on a positive-
list approach which allows for a more gradual
liberalization and the possibility of trade-offs and
obtaining reciprocal benefits. Third, under Article
XIX:2, the low-income countries have the flexibil-
ity to open fewer sectors, liberalize fewer types of
transactions and progressively expand market access
to foreign services suppliers in line with their level
of development. In addition, when making access to
their markets available, developing and least-devel-
oped countries also have the right to attach to such
access specific conditions relating, for example, to
technology transfer, training, local content require-
ments, etc.
C. Manufactures
While agriculture and international trade in
services are pre-determined components of the mar-
ket access negotiations in the Millennium Round, the
inclusion of trade in manufactured products does not
enjoy this status. Hence, there is considerable de-
bate about whether the new round should include
negotiations leading to further liberalization of trade
in manufactures. The existence of continuing debate
indicates that support for the inclusion of this issue
in the negotiating agenda is not unanimous. Some
developing and least-developed countries regard talk
of negotiation on industrial tariffs as “premature”,
citing in support the need for them to “digest” the
impact of their UR tariff reduction commitments.
There are other countries, however, who view the
inclusion of industrial tariff negotiations as a way of
ensuring a more “balanced” and comprehensive
round; according to this perspective, negotiations on
industrial tariffs would complement those mandated
in the built-in agenda on agriculture and services.
The debate suggests at least three reasons why
the inclusion of industrial tariff negotiations could
be important from the perspectives of the low-income
countries. First, the proposal for bound quota-and-
duty free market access for all exports of the
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markets needs to be formally negotiated and agreed
in both the agricultural and manufactured goods
sectors. Hence, it would be in the interest of the
least-developed countries to have industrial tariff
negotiations placed explicitly on the agenda of the
Millennium Round. Second, the developing coun-
tries have an obvious interest in the reduction of
industrial tariff peaks and elimination of tariff esca-
lation in the markets of developed countries. These
are also problems that can be properly addressed only
if negotiations on industrial tariffs are part of the new
round. Third, it appears that the low-income coun-
tries could derive substantial benefits from further
liberalization of trade in manufactured products and
hence, for this reason, industrial tariff negotiations
should be admitted into the agenda.
Each of the last two reasons deserves further
elaboration. To begin with, it is well established that,
although the UR reduced the overall degree of tariff
escalation in developed countries, a considerable
amount of it continues to exist in respect of products
of export interest to the low-income countries. In
addition, post-UR tariff escalation in the developed
countries shows a significant bias against imports
from the low-income countries; this being a specific
manifestation of the observed fact that “the trade-
weighted aggregate manufacture applied tariffs
facing developing country exports of manufactures
to high-income countries are almost four times higher
than the same tariffs facing industrial country ex-
porters to the same markets” (Hertel and Martin,
1999: 4). In principle, not only the level of a tariff
but also the structure of the tariffs can create distor-
tions in international production and trading systems.
In particular, tariff escalation can be a major obsta-
cle against the promotion of local processing in
exporting countries. To the extent that it creates a
bias towards trade in primary products, tariff escala-
tion tends to have a negative effect on the
industrialization efforts of low-income countries
(UNCTAD, 1998). Tariff escalation occurs when tar-
iffs rise with the stages of further processing.
Escalating tariffs provide added protection to domes-
tic processing industries while reducing the access
of exporters to the market for processed products. In
this sense, tariff escalation may constitute a signifi-
cant problem for the diversification of the exports of
low-income countries. A recent study (FAO, 1997)
shows that while food processing constitutes a ma-
jor export industry of low-income countries, their
exports are largely concentrated in the first stage of
processing; more advanced food industry products
make up only 5 per cent of the food-industry exports
of least-developed countries and about 17 per cent
of that of developing countries compared to almost
33 per cent for the developed countries.
Post-UR tariff peaks also constitute a signifi-
cant market access barrier for the low-income
countries. UNCTAD (1998) shows that large propor-
tions of clothing and textile imports from the
low-income countries (in the US, the EU, Canada,
and Japan) are subject to high tariffs which are typi-
cally combined with quantitative import restrictions.
The same problem extends to such products of strong
export interest for the low-income countries as foot-
wear, leather and travel goods. Furthermore, it is
claimed that processed food products account for
about 30 per cent of all tariff peaks in the EU, about
17 per cent in the US and as much as 40 per cent in
Japan. It seems that the problems of tariff peaks and
tariff escalation are attributable, at least partly, to the
linear tariff reduction approach that was utilized in
the UR negotiations which resulted in larger reduc-
tions in lower tariffs and hence accentuated tariff
peaks and tariff escalation. Thus, dealing with these
problems requires not only having negotiations on
industrial tariffs on the agenda of the new round but
also adopting the “Swiss formula” approach as a
means of generating a liberalization process that
could reduce tariff peaks and eliminate tariff escala-
tion.
Hertel and Martin (1999) provide strong sup-
port for the final reason why the low-income
countries should ensure that industrial tariff nego-
tiations are included on the agenda of the Millennium
Round. The argument, in a nutshell, is that further
multilateral liberalization of trade in manufactured
products would not only yield significant export gains
for the low-income countries, these countries also
stand to make substantially larger gains than the de-
veloped countries. This argument is built around
several stylized facts: the share manufactures in the
merchandise exports of developing countries is
around 75 per cent and will increase further; almost
40 per cent (and rising) of developing country ex-
ports of manufactures go to other developing
countries; exports of manufactures from developing
countries face an average tariff of about 13 per cent
in other developing countries and roughly 11 per cent
in the developed countries. Hence, a significant
across-the-board reduction in the tariff on manufac-
tures will stimulate demand for developing country
exports relatively more than they do for developed
country manufactured exports. As a result, the “big-
gest gainers from manufactures tariff cuts would be
the developing countries as opposed to the high-in-
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is important to note that this result reflects a combi-
nation of the increased market access enjoyed by the
developing countries (in their own markets as well
as in those of the developed countries) and the in-
creased efficiency gains to be derived from reducing
their own protective barriers.
On balance, the developing and least-developed
countries could find it beneficial to include indus-
trial tariff negotiations in the agenda of the new round
if doing so would lead to the following: (i) enable
the least-developed countries to receive a multilat-
erally bound duty-free and quota-free access for all
their exports to the developed countries as well as
substantial preferential access (up to 50 per cent of
the applied manufacture tariffs) for all their exports
to the developing countries; (ii) substantially reduce
tariff peaks and eliminate the tariff escalation that
confront the exports of manufactures from the de-
veloping countries to the developed countries; and
(iii) reduce the tariff barrier on manufactured prod-
ucts between developing countries. The market
access obligation on the part of the least-developed
countries should include an agreement to accept 100
per cent binding of their industrial tariffs and at a
bound rate of not more than 50 per cent. This obliga-
tion is not just a quid pro quo for the special market
access benefits they will receive from the developed
and developing countries but, perhaps more impor-
tantly, as a means of ensuring that they do not have
room to exercise more flexibility than they require
to maintain modest protection and generate adequate
fiscal revenue and to ensure that their trade policy
becomes more stable, reliable and credible.
IV. Multilateral rules and domestic
regulatory systems
The increasing integration and globalization of
the world economy appear to be associated with
greater concerns with national domestic policies in
so far as they may be perceived to affect interna-
tional competitiveness. These perceptions have, in
the last two decades or so, often been translated into
pressures to reduce differences in domestic policies
at the national level that are thought to have sig-
nificant consequences for trade. In addition, the
globalization of production and markets appears to
focus greater attention on large differences in national
regulatory systems and their cost implications. As a
result of these recognition and pressures, an increas-
ing component of the multilateral trade agenda “now
goes beyond the border into areas such as domestic
regulation” (Stiglitz, 1999: 36). The recent coverage
of international trade in services in multilateral trade
agreements has moved this process forward because
of the close relationship between domestic regula-
tory reform and the liberalization of international
trade in services (Feketekuty, 1998). Since many
services sectors are heavily regulated by national gov-
ernments, effective liberalization of trade in services
often requires simultaneous reform of domestic regu-
latory systems, at least to reduce or eliminate
elements of discriminatory bias against foreign serv-
ices providers.
Blackhurst (1998) traces how the GATT/WTO
mandate has evolved to reflect this movement of the
multilateral trade agenda from basic concern with
border measures into the arena of domestic policies
and associated regulatory systems. As he notes, the
GATT system originally covered trade in goods and
its policy coverage was limited to measures applied
at the border, specifically tariffs and quantitative re-
strictions. But during the Tokyo Round (1973–1979),
the GATT made its first significant move inside the
border as multilateral rules were negotiated to cover
technical standards, production subsidies, and gov-
ernment procurement. However, the new set of rules
took the form of “codes” to which only a sub-group
of the GATT contracting parties subscribed. All this
changed more dramatically as a result of the Uru-
guay Round when the GATT/WTO mandate was
expanded even further. In particular, a new trade
policy review mechanism was established in the con-
text of which the trade regimes of individual members
are collectively reviewed and evaluated by other
WTO members, and the list of national policies cov-
ered by multilateral rules was further expanded to
include investment policies in the services area, na-
tional laws for intellectual property protection,
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, regulations
for pre-shipment inspection, and customs valuation.
In addition, the Tokyo Round “codes” were fully
multilaterized; while cooperation was established
between the WTO, the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund with view to achieving “greater
coherence in global economic policymaking”. Finally
ongoing discussions within and outside the WTO
suggest that its mandate may be further expanded to
cover additional issues in the traditional domain of
domestic policy such as investment policy, competi-
tion policy, transparency in government procurement,
labour standards, and environmental standards.
The increasing intrusion of WTO rules into the
national domestic policy space has been driven by at
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First, the success of the GATT/WTO system in re-
ducing conventional border protection measures,
especially among the major trading countries, makes
non-border restrictions on market access more vis-
ible to trading partners. Second, a desire to gain
access to the dispute settlement and enforcement
mechanism of the WTO appears to have become a
strong motivation for some of the new and proposed
multilateral rules that intrude into the domestic policy
space. In other words, the perceived effectiveness of
trade sanctions seems to attract those who wish to
tie their pet causes to he mast of the WTO, even when
these may have very little to do directly with trade
and trade policy.
It is clear, of course, that the influence of policy
on trade flows is not necessarily limited to the im-
pact of border measures but can, in principle, extend
to any policy interactions that indirectly affect trade
through their impact on domestic production and
consumption (Peroni and Whalley, 1998). To this
extent, therefore, a wide variety of domestic poli-
cies can be drawn into the debate regarding the
restrictiveness or otherwise of a country’s trade and
trade-related policy regime. Similarly, a large number
of domestic policies can be viewed as possible sub-
stitutes for traditional border measures for the
purposes of restraining or promoting trade. It is in
this context that a strong case can be made that na-
tional standards and domestic regulations could
create significant barriers to trade over and beyond
the explicit trade barriers at national borders. It is
important to note, however, that the indirect impact
of domestic policies on international trade flows is
more likely to become significant only after border
measures have been sufficiently reduced. In other
words, such domestic policies may become “bind-
ing constraints” on trade flows when border measures
have fallen to, perhaps, the current level among the
developed countries; they are therefore unlikely to
have the same significance in the developing and
least-developed countries where traditional border
trade barriers are still quite high.
Where a range of domestic policies and regula-
tions is considered to have significant impact on in-
ternational trade flows, it could become a legitimate
candidate for multilateral rules. The multilateral
agreement that codifies such rule scan be justified to
the extent that it helps to offset an externality im-
posed by policies of other countries and it helps gov-
ernments to overcome domestic political economy
constraints that impede the adoption of appropriate
domestic regulatory reforms (Hoeckman and Holmes,
1998). But the articulation and negotiation of such
common sets of multilateral rules pose difficult prob-
lems, given that such agreements would involve a
large number of countries at different levels of de-
velopment and with different cultural, social and
political systems (Cable, 1996). The process must
confront the fundamental question of how far national
policies and domestic regulatory systems should be
harmonized globally and how much domestic policy
space should be left to national governments. While
a convergence of national policies and regulatory
standards could facilitate international trade in
goods and services, the process faces significant
operationalization problems. In any case, as Mussa
(1997: 7) argues, “there is no presumption that har-
monization of all domestic policies and business prac-
tices is necessary for trade to be mutually beneficial...
if it were, should we also demand the harmonization
of climate?” Much more importantly, there is danger
that the current trend risks overloading the multilat-
eral trading system with too many objectives.
Where they are particularly significant, the
trade-inhibiting impact of national policies and do-
mestic regulations may need to be harmonized. This
can be accomplished in one of two ways (Baldwin,
1999). Total harmonization can be achieved via a
process of multilateral negotiations in which differ-
ences between national rules are narrowed. The same
result can be achieved through the “hegemonic route”
in which other countries adopt the national stand-
ards of the hegemony. Even in the negotiation route,
harmonization implies the imposition of a uniform
set of rules and the rules that are likely to form the
core around which the harmonized norms are con-
structed are likely to be those of the developed
countries. Put more directly, Baldwin (1999: 24–25)
asserts that “hegemonic harmonization is the default
option for many small nations that are heavily de-
pendent on a large trading partner such as the US,
the EU or Japan ... the ongoing mutual recognition
agreements and hegemonic harmonization will tend
to systematically discriminate against industrial
goods produced in developing nations”.
An important way to protect the developing and
least-developed countries from this danger is to in-
sist that the WTO should reduce the degree of
intrusion of its rule-making mandate to the bare
minimum which is necessary to provide a viable
framework for open cross-border competition and
trade flows (Feketekuty, 1998). Since multilateral
trade rules are basically designed to ensure market
access rather than to directly promote economic ef-
ficiency and social welfare, these rules should be
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sure the non-discriminatory design and application
of national policies and domestic regulatory stand-
ards whose primary aims would be to enhance
economic efficiency and promote social welfare.
These are aims requiring policies and regulations that
must be addressed at the national level.
The discussion above suggests that the current
trend towards the harmonization of national policies
and domestic regulations through the articulation and
negotiation of multilateral rules is largely inappro-
priate for many low-income countries and is, in any
case, likely to force them into arrangements that are
inherently likely to systematically discriminate
against their exports. It may be useful to explore fur-
ther whether or not and the extent to which this
general conclusion may be confirmed in the case of
some of the existing or proposed multilateral rules.
For analytical convenience, it is useful to attempt to
classify these rules into a few broad groups, based
largely on what appears to be their predominant ob-
jectives. While no claim can be made regarding their
universal acceptance, the groupings indicated below
offers a rough indication of shared features within
each category. The existing multilateral rules that can
be described as primarily trade-facilitating include
those on anti-dumping, pre-shipment inspection, cus-
toms valuation, subsidies, and TRIMS. Proposed new
rules under the same group include those on compe-
tition policy, investment policy, and transparency in
government procurement. These existing and pro-
posed rules are aimed at facilitating trade through
increased efficiency and competition. There is a spe-
cial property protection multilateral agreement that
appears to stand all on its own. This is the TRIPs
agreement. Within the category of health and safety
protection rules are the SPS and TBT agreements
while under social standards can be classified the
proposed multilateral rules relating to labour and
environmental standards. Each of these broad cat-
egories is discussed in what follows.
A. Trade facilitation rules
In broad terms, existing and proposed multilat-
eral rules aimed at facilitating trade flows either by
increasing the efficiency of the trade-flow process
or enhancing competition cover a wide variety of
measures and agreements. Several UR agreements
(customs valuation, import licensing procedures and
preshipment inspection) have direct implications for
customs procedures and the efficiency with which
trade moves across national borders. The primary aim
of these multilateral agreements is to harmonize and
simplify customs procedures around the world as a
cost-effective way of reducing non-tariff barriers
associated with trade (Messerlin and Zarrouk, 1999).
They have been motivated largely by the high ad-
ministrative and compliance costs (estimated at 7 to
10 per cent of global trade) imposed by the customs
procedures. These costs are, in turn, traced to exces-
sive documentation requirements, lack of automation,
lack of transparency in import and export require-
ments, and corruption among customs officials
induced, partly, by over-regulation. However, there
exists the World Customs Organisation (WCO)
whose mandate it is to harmonize and simplify cus-
toms procedures worldwide. The WCO has indeed
established the basic principles involved in the
context of its Kyoto Convention. This provides a
comprehensive articulation of trade facilitation
objectives, mechanisms and “best practices”. It en-
visions a technology-based customs administration
system featuring electronic reporting of trade trans-
actions, risk assessment based on selective checking,
and periodic declaration and payment. Obvious
difficulties arise for low-income countries with in-
adequate infrastructure. For the developing and
least-developed countries, compliance with the Kyoto
Convention will require human and institutional ca-
pacity building involving valuation and enforcement
training and the establishment of the necessary in-
frastructure.
Those who see a WCO/WTO cooperation es-
sentially in terms of lending the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism to enforce WCO’s Kyoto con-
vention must recognize that the low-income countries
will face huge implementation and compliance costs.
These create huddles that cannot be overcome
through “time-phased concessions”. It is unlikely that
implementation and compliance can be fully achieved
as quickly as the time-phased concessions imply in
the absence of substantial technical and financial
support. Finger and Schuler (1999: 10) argue that
the valuation process prescribed by the multilateral
rules “presumes an administrative environment that
does not exist in many of the least developed coun-
tries”. This is clearly an example of the “hegemonic
route” to harmonization of national standards that
inherently penalizes the low-income countries.
The implementation of the TRIMs agreement
does not involve the same kind of resources in build-
ing up human and institutional capacity in the devel-
oping and least-developed countries. But it does
affect their capacity building effort in another way.
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certain traditional tools of industrialization and de-
velopment, such as local content requirements, the
agreement may constrain the production and export
supply response of many low-income countries
whose “initial conditions” do not include a virile in-
dustrial base. Article 5.3 of the TRIMS agreement
recognizes the importance of taking account of the
development, financial and trade needs of the least
developed and developing countries in dealing with
TRIMs. Its operationalization could provide a mecha-
nism through which a more careful and analytically
based differentiation might be made between the
various measures whose use is constrained or pro-
hibited by the agreement to determine what their
adverse effects on trade are, and how significant are
the adverse trade effects. This process could produce
a more reasonable classification of measures whose
permissible use, constrained use or prohibition would
be related to different levels of development or coun-
try category (least-developed, developing or devel-
oped) rather than to “transitional periods” that do
not capture each country’s initial conditions and ca-
pacity-building needs.
Competition policy was introduced as a possi-
ble subject of multilateral negotiations in the context
of a review of the TRIMs agreement. Its subsequent
discussion has focused on three possible end-results:
a stand-alone multilateral agreement on competition
policy, strengthening of the competition policy as-
pects of existing UR agreements, and no WTO rules
at all on competition policy.
Clearly, competition policy has an important
role to play, in all countries, in promoting a competi-
tive environment in which enterprises are not
permitted to behave collusively and market power is
not exploited to the detriment of societal welfare. But
all this refers to the responsibility of national com-
petition policy. There may, of course, be particular
reasons for needing some international cooperation
in competition policy. Differences in national com-
petition regimes might result in important omission
that could be eliminated through international rules.
Such multilateral arrangements may also protect low-
income countries from the abuse of market power
by transnational companies whose activities they may
lack the power to control on their own.
There are some preliminary estimates (see
Peroni and Whalley, 1998) which show that the po-
tential gains to developing countries from effective
competition policy could be as large as 5 to 6 per
cent of national income. But most of these gains are
expected to result from two major sources; i.e. re-
duction of mark-ups by foreign suppliers to devel-
oping country markets, and reduced concentration
in the domestic markets of the developing countries
associated with competition policy. Both of these are
achievable through liberalization, deregulation and
enhanced competition measures in the developing
countries themselves and they are thus not necessar-
ily attributable to multilateral competition rules. This
suggests the interest that the low-income countries
may have in pursuing an active competition can and
should be pursued through domestic initiatives and
independently of the WTO’s (Hoekman and Holmes,
1998). Many of these countries do not have national
competition laws, and those that have them on paper
are often severely constrained by limited ability to
implement due to lack of appropriate human and in-
stitutional capacity. While the existence of some
multilateral rules and surveillance mechanism could
conceivably assist the process of establishing national
competence in implementing competition rules in the
low-income countries, this “assistance” is likely to
come at a very stiff price, in terms of harmonized
rules and implementation infrastructure, that most
of them can ill afford.
Investment is the second major issue suggested
as the basis for establishing multilateral discipline
as part of the review of the TRIMS agreement. Some
of the discussion has gone even further than this to
argue in favour of a comprehensive set of multilat-
eral principles and rules on investment developed
and integrated into the WTO framework. But, as in
the case of competition policy, there does not appear
to be a convincing case to justify the support of the
low-income countries for moving in this direction.
These countries must be wary of an uncritical and
undifferentiated approach to foreign investment that
a multilateral agreement might directly or indirectly
endorse. In any case, some existing agreements (such
as TRIMs and particularly GATS) do provide ample
scope for pursuing further liberalization in the area
of investment. As Hoekman and Saggi (1999) sug-
gest, by including “commercial presence” as one of
the four modes of supply of services, GATS offers
an opportunity to liberalize foreign direct investment
in services, where it matters most.
B. Special property protection rules
The TRIPs agreement stands out as a clear case
of unambiguous loss for many developing and least-
developed countries. It is, perhaps, the clearest case
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into the WTO framework and away from the legiti-
mate mandate of another international organization
(WIPO) simply to take advantage of what is perceived
to be the more effective enforcement mechanism of
the WTO. As Primo Braga et al. (1999) demonstrate,
the standard of intellectual property protection in a
given country is largely explained by its level of eco-
nomic development. Hence, for poor countries that
have limited ability to create much intellectual prop-
erty and thus little to gain from its protection,
maintaining a strong intellectual property protection
regime amounts to granting “monopolies” to foreign
patentees at considerable cost to themselves. In ad-
dition, strong intellectual property protection rights
tend to restrict the diffusion of knowledge and infor-
mation so badly needed for the development of
low-income countries; it is also associated with price
increases (e.g. for pharmaceutical products) which
have adverse distributive implications.
In their attempts to implement the TRIPs agree-
ment, many low-income countries have been making
massive changes to their legislative and enforcement
institutions. The enforcement related problems are
particularly serious as they involve, in many cases,
wholesale training or retraining of administrative,
judicial, police and customs personnel. The negotia-
tions leading to the TRIPs agreement did not “deal
with the costs of the investments the agreement man-
dated - not even how much the costs would be, much
less with the return in that application versus in some
alternative use” (Finger and Schuler, 1999: 25). Al-
though Article 67 of the agreement makes provision
for technical assistance, while Article 6.2 obligates
developed country members to provide incentives to
enterprises and institution in their territories for the
purpose of promoting and encouraging technology
transfer no operational modalities have been estab-
lished for actualizing any of them. To the extent that
the new round presents the developing and least-
developed countries with an opportunity to make
changes in the TRIPs agreement, concerted efforts
aimed at establishing these modalities and making these
provisions obligatory should probably receive priority.
C. Health and safety protection rules
The main multilateral rules for protecting health
and safety in the context of international trade are
codified in the WTO agreements on sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) measures and the technical bar-
riers to trade (TBT). In principle these agreements
seek to maintain food product quality and safety with-
out unduly restricting cross-border trade. While both
are expected to reflect standards established by the
appropriate and widely recognized international
standard setting bodies, it is recognized that rising
consumer concerns in developed countries over food
quality and safety may induce these countries to set
increasingly higher standards, based on their own
assessment of risk.
In the cases of SPS and TBT, it is not particu-
larly useful for the low-income countries to seek
exemption from or a weakening of the multilateral
discipline since this would simply erode consumer
confidence in their exports. Yet, they face major chal-
lenges in implementing these agreements, given the
often large gap between the current standards of their
exports and the levels of the internationally recog-
nized standards, and their limited technical and
financial ability to bridge the gap as quickly as the
agreements provide for. Both agreements articulate
SDT provisions for the developing and least devel-
oped countries primarily in terms of offer of financial
and technical assistance. But, again, as Finger and
Schuler (1999: 5) observe, “this provision is not a
binding commitment; in effect, the developing coun-
tries have taken on bound commitments to implement
in exchange for unbound commitments of assistance
to implement”. The new round of multilateral trade
negotiations may provide the opportunity to demon-
strate the fundamental unfairness of this and to press
for a rebalancing of the rights and obligations im-
plicit in these two agreements.
D. Social standards
The proposal to negotiate multilateral WTO
rules relating to labour and environmental standards
is, in many ways, not unlike what the developed coun-
tries apparently succeeded in doing with respect to
the TRIPs agreement. In particular, this proposal
seeks multilateral agreements in the context of WTO
essentially to benefit from the effective enforcement
mechanism of the WTO which appears lacking in
the International Labour Organization (with respect
to labour standards) and in the various fora for the
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).
Also, like intellectual property protection, both la-
bour and environmental standards tend to be related
to a country’s level of development, and hence at-
tempts to impose standards that are based on some
harmonized higher levels on the low-income coun-
tries are likely to be unsustainably costly for them
and hence, in the end, counter-productive.22 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 2
Along these lines, Krueger (1999) likens the
demand for labour standards to that of normal goods
which tends to rise with income and argues that if
trade agreements lead to increase in national income,
the beneficiary countries are likely to choose on their
own to strengthen and enforce appropriate labour
standards. Anderson (1996: 318) makes roughly the
same point with respect to environmental standards
i.e. “differences in per capita income matter because
as countries become richer, they increase their de-
mand for normal goods, including environmental
standards”.
In addition, both of these analysts offer some
benchmarks with respect to the relationship between
income and the standards. Anderson (1996: 324) as-
serts that “once middle-income status is reached,
people tend to alter their behaviour in ways that re-
duce pressures on the environment”. On his part,
Krueger (1996: 295) offers more specific numbers: “in
countries where GDP per capita exceeds $5000 (in 1996
prices) ... employment of young children is negligible”.
There are, at least, two other arguments against
developing multilateral agreements on labour and
environmental standards in the context of the WTO.
First is that attempts to impose unnecessarily high
labour and environmental standards on the low-in-
come countries will amount to depriving them of
important elements of their comparative advantage
in international trade Krueger (1995). Secondly, the
development of WTO rules for enforcing labour and
environmental standards would explicitly invite the
use of trade policy for dealing with problems that
are not caused by international trade. These are prob-
lems of development that cannot be solved in an
effective and sustainable ways using trade policy
measures. It should not be surprising, of course, that
in spite of the fairly strong arguments against the
proposal, attempts will continue to be made to pur-
sue it further during the forthcoming negotiations.
The developing and least-developed countries there-
fore need to be particularly alert to avoid having a
new set of TRIPs – like multilateral agreements im-
posed on them again, perhaps via the omnibus “single
undertaking” approach.
V. Participation in the WTO process
Since the Tokyo Round and particularly in the
build-up leading to the launch of the Uruguay round,
the developed countries have called for greater in-
tegration of the developing and least-developed
countries into the global economy and their fuller
participation in the WTO process. The UR agreements,
the problems associated with their implementation
and recent decisions of the WTO show increasing
appreciation of the fact that many of the low-income
countries are not able to participate fully and effec-
tively in the WTO process due to acute limitations
arising from inadequate human and institutional ca-
pacity, sub-optimal allocation of that capacity in some
cases, as well as the management structure and the
decision-making processes of the WTO itself.
There are at lest, three distinct but inter-related
dimensions to participation in the WTO process
(Oyejide, 1999). First is the active involvement in
designing the rules governing multilateral trade and
trade-related interactions. Second is the “give-and-
take” involved in the process of trade negotiations
through which interests are identified, articulated and
“concessions” constructed around these interests are
exchanged. The third dimension of participation con-
sists of the effective use of the established rules and
institutional mechanisms to ensure that each mem-
ber country’s rights are enforced and its obligations
are met.
Taken together, these three dimensions of
participation in the WTO process pose significant
challenges for the low-income countries. Their ac-
tive participation is an important way of ensuring
that their particular concerns and interests are ad-
equately reflected in the agreements that define the
rules of the world trading system as well as the com-
pliance and enforcement mechanisms for implement-
ing the agreements. To do this effectively, they must
be able to articulate their interests and effectively
define their rights in the WTO framework. As the
WTO process becomes increasingly more complex
and technical, this challenge becomes even more
critical.
The extent and quality of a country’s participa-
tion in the WTO process are largely determined by
its capacity to deploy a number of competencies
(UNCTAD, 1996). One set of these competencies
involves the capacity to fully understand and inter-
nalize the contents, implications and constraints of
various WTO agreements; to identify and take ad-
vantage of the trade and trade-related opportunities
made available under these agreements; and to fulfil
the obligations that they impose. A second set of
competencies relates to the country’s capacity to ar-
ticulate trade objectives and effectively pursue them
in the context of multilateral negotiations and to for-
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that are, consistent with the country’s WTO obliga-
tions. A final set of competencies is associated with
the country’s capacity to assert and defend its ac-
quired trade and trade related rights against potential
and actual infringement and other challenges.
These three sets of core competencies are
typically channelled through three mechanisms
(Blackhurst, 1999). A country’s resident delegation
in Geneva, skilled in negotiation and diplomacy,
serves as the arrowhead. Key staff in home capitals,
with analytical and policy-making skills, provide
direct operational support and guidance to the resi-
dent delegation. Finally, the more general personnel
requirement, with the requisite technical, legal, po-
litical and legislative skills, which is distributed
among the various trade policy institutions in the
country contributes to effective participation in the
WTO process by interfacing with the private sector
and implementing the country’s commitments and
defending its rights.
The special significance of the two home-based
mechanisms is strongly stressed in the literature.
Thus, Yeo (1998: 27) asserts that the “most impor-
tant initiatives must be taken at the national level”.
Along the same lines, Michalopoulos (1998: 18) ar-
gues that strengthening the institutional capacity at
home for policy-making and implementation is criti-
cal for effective participation in the WTO process;
and concludes that “the increased range and com-
plexity of technical issues handled by the WTO
implies that the capacity of developing countries to
participate effectively in the work of the WTO will
depend very heavily on the analytical capacity and
strength of the governmental and other institutions
handling the range of WTO issues in the capitals”.
Establishing an adequate and skilled profes-
sional home-based support staff has turned out to be
quite difficult in many low-income countries, espe-
cially in Africa (Oyejide, 1999; Ogunkola, 1999).
Two major parts of the explanation for this appear to
be the diffused nature of the trade policy-making
process in many of these countries and the lack of
coordination among the institutions involved in the
articulation and implementation of trade policy. In
the typical African country, trade policy-making
involves a number of government ministries, de-
partments and related institutions. At the centre of
these agencies is the Cabinet; this is the highest policy
making body which is chaired by the President and
in which all ministries are represented. While major
trade policy decisions are conducted through the
Cabinet, the key policy implementation roles are
performed by the Ministry of Finance (trade taxes
and revenue), the Ministry of Trade and Industry
(trade and industrial policy), and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (commercial diplomacy and inter-
national agreements.)
Coordination problems arise from various
sources, including differences regarding the location
of real compared to nominal authority with respect
to the articulation and implementation of trade policy
as well as differences in terms of which institution
has the responsibility for trade policy and which gov-
ernment agency has the power to negotiate and sign
international (including trade) agreements) In many
cases, the role of the Ministry of Finance looms quite
large in the articulation and implementation of
trade policy even though nominal authority typically
lies with the Trade Ministry. Similarly, and as
Ohiorhenuan (1998) suggests, in African countries
where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has primary
responsibility for negotiating international trade
agreements, not only is the country’s participation
driven by foreign policy rather than economic con-
siderations, the lead agency in multilateral trade
negotiations is incapacitated by its limited under-
standing of economic issues and its little substantive
interaction with the major domestic trade policy
stakeholders.
The multiplicity of institutions involved in trade
policy make coordination an important issue. Coordi-
nation is necessary not only among governmental
agencies but also between them and the private sec-
tor. Virtually all African countries have established
some form of coordination for dealing with WTO
matters. But in virtually all cases, these coordina-
tion vehicles are creatures of recent vintage (around
the mid-1990s) where track record and sustainability
remain suspect. In practice, coordination appears to
occur primarily among institutions within the high-
est level of government while the involvement of the
private sector is largely ad hoc and limited.
Because the smallness and low income of many
developing and least developed countries may be
expected to adversely affect their ability to harness
the human materials and institutional capacity re-
quired for effective participation in the WTO process
on an individual basis, the possibility of some re-
gional or sub-regional coordination of trade policy
has received attention. For instance, Michalopoulos
(1998) argues that it may not necessarily be an opti-
mal use of their scarce resources to seek individual
representation in the context of the WTO process; it
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establish a process of consultation with “like-minded”
countries in the context of which their interests can
be reflected in the WTO.
The “member-driven” nature of the WTO; its
wide and growing mandate, and its unusually large
number of meetings and consultations (Blackhurst,
1998) demand the active daily participation of na-
tional delegates as an essential part of its activities.
This places considerable premium on a country’s
capacity to maintain in Geneva a large, skilled and
versatile delegation which can engage in the daily
meetings and consultations that ultimately move the
WTO process. Many of the developing and least-
developed countries face severe difficulties in this
respect. In particular, most of the least-developed
countries are either not represented at all or inad-
equately represented in Geneva; their delegates often
lack technical expertise and negotiating experience;
lack access to in-depth analysis of the implications
of the proposal they are required to negotiate and
receive inadequate support and guidance from their
home capitals (Oyejide, 1990, 1997; Michalopoulos,
1998). A recent survey of African delegations in
Geneva shows that virtually all of them are staffed
by officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
rather than from the Ministry of Trade; i.e. people
who have had little or nothing to do with WTO mat-
ters prior to their arrival in Geneva and whose
experience is very likely not to be put to use on the
same matters when they return home (Blackhurst
et al., 1999).
In appears that the question of inadequate
representation in Geneva is not explicable solely in
terms of inadequate resources on the part of many
low-income countries. These same countries are, ap-
parently, able to maintain sizable permanent
delegations in Brussels and New York; a change of
priorities from political to commercial diplomacy
could generate a re-allocation of an appropriate
number of staff from Brussels and New York to
Geneva and thus ensure a more effective representa-
tion, in most cases, at the WTO (Blackhurst et al.,
1999).
But the WTO itself could be more to enhance
the participation of its low-income members. One
way is to substantially expand its technical assist-
ance and another is to reach out to these countries
more effectively than it has done so far. The need for
technical assistance has grown rapidly since the mid-
1980s as the number of low-income WTO members
has increased (by over 50 per cent). However, neither
the technical assistance budget nor the staffing of
the WTO Secretariat has experienced a correspond-
ing growth. While a limited number of generous
donors have provided some funding for technical
assistance, this option does not offer a sustainable
solution to what has emerged as a long term prob-
lem. What is needed is a decision to use technical
assistance more aggressively as an instrument for
enhancing the participation of low-income countries
by providing adequate funding from the regular
budget of the WTO and by focusing this assistance
on the key human, knowledge and institutional
capacity-building needs of the low-income members
of the WTO.
A decision by the WTO to provide more effec-
tive out-reach services to these members would
complement and enhance the provision of technical
assistance (Blackhurst and Lyakurwa, 1998). The
opening of WTO regional offices in Africa, Asia and
Latin America should assist in providing demand-
driven technical assistance more effectively and help
facilitate the education of both public and private
sector stakeholders in these countries regarding the
WTO and its activities.
VI. Conclusion
A new round of multilateral trade negotiations
will present many developing and least-developed
countries with considerable challenges but also sig-
nificant opportunities. They will be challenged by
the fact that many of them are still struggling with
the implementation of the UR agreements, their ob-
ligations under which have not been fully digested.
Their preparation for a new round is likely to be
mostly inadequate because many of them have not
succeeded in fully building up the human, knowl-
edge and institutional capacity that an active and
effective participation in the WTO process requires.
In spite of these inadequacies, a new round of nego-
tiations will confront them with the need to take
decisions on complex issues that they may not have
adequately analysed and understood. As in previous
negotiations, the negotiators of many low-income
countries will probably not receive adequate support
and timely instruction from their home capitals; and
unlike their developed country counterparts who can
count on the active support and assistance of the
private sector, they may have to do without this im-
portant input.
But they will also be presented with significant
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enhanced and more secure market access but also to
attempt to undo some of the damages imposed by
the Uruguay Round agreements dealing with rules
and standards. It is clear that the low-income coun-
tries have taken on many mandatory obligations in
exchange for non-binding and “best endeavour” con-
cessions from the developed countries. Whether and
how this fundamentally unfair “exchange” can be
rebalanced should be a major concern for the devel-
oping and least-developed countries in the new round.
The new round should also offer the low-in-
come countries an opportunity to be more pro-active
in terms of defining its agenda. They could, for in-
stance, take the lead by proposing multilaterally
negotiated decisions regarding the criteria for cat-
egorizing WTO member countries as well as the form
and context of SDT for the developing and least-de-
veloped countries. In making demands on the
developed countries, in this context, it would be po-
litically appealing of the developing countries could
offer to share the “burden” of such demand by pro-
viding significant trade preferences to the least
developed countries.
A fuller recognition of the significance of the
WTO, by the low-income countries, for their devel-
opment should be increasingly reflected in the
attention and resources that they devote to the WTO
process. A more active and effective participation is
required if the low-income countries hope to use their
WTO membership to craft a partnership for devel-
opment through trade and to use its process as a
means of more fully integrating into the global
economy on their own terms. These countries could
do more to enhance their participation by re-allocat-
ing more of their “negotiating” staff away from
Brussels and New York to Geneva; the WTO could
assist further by substantially expanding its techni-
cal assistance and establishing regional offices in the
low-income regions.
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